Photo of Jyoti Dastidar

Partner in the Disputes Resolution Practice at the Delhi office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Jyoti is an Advocate on Record and specialises in civil and constitutional laws, arbitration, and white collar crimes. She can be reached at





The Delhi High Court, had recently in the case of National Highway Authority of India v. Trichy Thanjavur Expressway Ltd. O.M.P. (COMM) 95/2023 and Trichy Thanjavur Expressway Ltd. v. National Highway Authority of India O.M.P. (COMM) 106/2023 (collectively the “Trichy Thanjavur Expressway Matters”), invited counsels to advance submissions in relation to a court’s powers under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), and more particularly on the power of courts to partially set aside arbitral awards.Continue Reading Determining the ‘Lakshman Rekha’ of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act

What is the Cost of Environmental Breaches? A Look at the Evolving Jurisprudence of Environmental Compensation

The term ‘compensation’ has been legally defined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be a return for loss or damage sustained. The Court expressly states that compensation must always be just, and not based on a whim or arbitrary.[1]

Environmental compensation refers to payment of monetary reparation by industries, imposed by authorities and judicial bodies for violating environmental rules and regulations. The imposition of environmental compensation on industry finds its basis in the key environmental law principle of ‘Polluter Pays.’ The Polluter Pays Principle, simply put, makes the offending industry responsible for the damage caused to the environment and to human health.[2] In the 1990s, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India began relying heavily on this principle to order industries to pay environmental compensation for breach of environmental regulations. [3]Continue Reading What is the Cost of Environmental Breaches? A Look at the Evolving Jurisprudence of Environmental Compensation

Legal Regime of Negotiable Instruments


Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), ascribes criminal liability for dishonour of a cheque. The purpose of the provision has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court to be the promotion of efficacy of banking operations and to ensure credibility in transacting business through cheques.[i] Since a large number of such transactions and cheque payments are done by companies, the very same intent appears to be captured in Section 141 of the NI Act, which extends vicarious criminal liability on officers associated with the company or firm. The law on Section 141 of the NI Act has been clarified and elaborated upon from time to time. However, the broad principle guiding the extent of liability remains the involvement of the director concerned in the day-to-day business affairs of the company. This is, however, not a straight-jacket formula, and the nuances determining the extent of liability need to be examined closely.Continue Reading Directors’ Vicarious Liability under Current Legal Regime of Negotiable Instruments Act: An Analysis of Evolving Judicial Precedents

Anti-Arbitration Injunctions - Judicial trends and finding the middle path

An Anti-Arbitration Injunction (“AAI”) is an injunction granted by courts to restrain parties or an arbitral tribunal from either commencing or continuing with arbitration proceedings.[1]  An AAI is generally sought before an arbitration commences or in the course of the arbitration hearing or after the conclusion of substantive hearing but before the rendering of final award.Continue Reading Anti-Arbitration Injunctions: Judicial trends and finding the middle path

Emergency Awards passed in Foreign-seated Arbitration - Enforceable or not

A recent award passed by an Emergency Arbitrator at the instance of NV Investment Holdings in relation to Reliance Retail Ventures Limited’s (RRVL) ongoing acquisition of Future Group’s retail, wholesale, logistics, and warehousing arm, has once again brought into sharp focus a gap in India’s aspirations to improve Ease of Doing Business in the country and create a conducive environment for enforcement of awards passed in foreign seated arbitrations.

Although the said Emergency Award directed Future Group to maintain status quo with regard to the transaction[1], recent news reports have confirmed that Future Group has already approached the Hon’ble Delhi High Court by way of a suit seeking to restrain Amazon from preventing the ₹24,713 crore deal from going through.[2]
Continue Reading Emergency Awards passed in Foreign-seated Arbitration: Enforceable or not ?

BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Supreme Court’s Much Needed Third Umpire Decision

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (2015 Amendment) came into force with effect from October 23, 2015. Although this amendment was enacted to remove controversies and iron out wrinkles in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (Parent Act), it has in fact, given rise to its own set of controversies. One of the burning issues was the applicability of the 2015 Amendment. Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment provides for its applicability, and reads as follows:

  1. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act.

One would believe that the above provision would have settled any issue of applicability of the 2015 Amendment. It has instead given rise to more litigation,[i] which has now been partially addressed by the Supreme Court.[ii]

The controversy in all the litigation that came up before the High Courts, and which also saw conflicting points of view, was around the applicability of the amended Section 36 of the Parent Act. In the pre-amendment era, when an award debtor challenged an award under Section 34, the award creditor was prevented from enforcing the award until a determination had been made by a court on the challenge, because of an ‘automatic stay’ on the operation of the award.

In order to overcome this, and for the benefit of award creditors, Section 36 of the Parent Act, was amended to do away with this ‘automatic stay’. It required the challenging party to separately apply for a stay and also required the court to direct the award debtor to deposit the award amount, so as to avoid frivolous challenges. The question for the courts has been the applicability of the amended Section 36 to Section 34 applications that were filed before and after the 2015 Amendment came into force.Continue Reading BCCI v. Kochi Cricket: Supreme Court’s Much Needed Third Umpire Decision