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Partner in the Dispute Resolution Practice at the Mumbai office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Aditya has expertise and extensive experience in commercial litigation and arbitration (both domestic and international), handling disputes both of a general commercial nature as well as public and regulatory disputes across sectors, including financial regulation, administrative, white collar, sports, media and entertainment, food and beverage, local government, planning and environment and public sector projects. He regularly appears and argues matters before Courts (including High Courts and the Supreme Court), Tribunals and Regulatory Authorities. He can be reached at aditya.mehta@cyrilshroff.com.

Supreme court reiterates that courts DO not sit in appeal over an award passed by an arbitrator

INTRODUCTION:

Recently, in NTPC v. M/s Deconar Services Pvt. Ltd.[1], a three judge bench of the Supreme Court has, in line with the settled principle of minimum interference in arbitral awards, inter alia reiterated that in order to succeed in a challenge against an arbitral award, the party challenging the award must show that the arbitrator’s award suffered from perversity; or an error of law; or that the arbitrator had otherwise misconducted himself. The Court highlighted that merely showing that there is another reasonable interpretation or possible view on the basis of the material on record is insufficient to allow interference by the Court.
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LEARNING TO SPRINT SUPREME COURT ISSUES DIRECTIONS TO REDUCE DELAY IN DISPOSING EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS

I. Introduction:

  1. In the past decade, the Indian judiciary has been globally recognized for its historic rulings. However, even such successes, more often than not, are tainted because of the time that goes by, in passing the final ruling in a case. Justice delayed is justice denied, as the adage goes. Delay is so integral to judicial proceedings in India that it not only effects litigants initiating legal proceedings, but also plagues the minds of decree holders who have painstakingly gone through the entire lifecycle of a litigation. Even armed with a decree, a litigant must once again fight an already conquered battle before the executing court.
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 Supreme Court Clarifies Law On Limitation Period For Filing An Appeal Under Section 37 Of The Arbitration Act

INTRODUCTION:

The Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer v. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.[1] has inter alia set right the law regarding the period of limitation for condonation of delay in filing appeals under Section 37[2] of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”). Overruling its earlier decision in N.V. International v. State of Assam[3] (“N.V. International”) and emphasising the central object of speedy disposal of disputes sought to be achieved by the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”), the Court has allowed condonation of only ‘short delays’, setting out strict parameters for permitting the same.
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This Is the End - What Now The Aftermath of an Award being Set Aside

There is scarcely any aspect of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), which has not seen the spectre of ad nauseum arguments and judicial pronouncements. Concepts have been devised, lauded, followed, and then set aside. Lawyers have forcefully argued for awards to be set aside, and Courts have assiduously upheld the essence and spirit of the concept of arbitration. The law has been set, and then upturned, and in this entire process, not much judicial/ legislative light seems to have fallen on the protagonist of this piece. The Act only hints at what happens after an award is set aside, and the ‘hint’ paints a somewhat grim picture. 
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Supreme Court Revisits the Venue – Seat Issue 

Introduction:

A division bench of the Supreme Court in M/s Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.[1] has recently reiterated the decision in BSG SGS SOMA JV vs. NHPC Limited[2], equating the juridical concepts of seat and venue. In this regard, the Court has clarified that a shift in venue by mutual agreement between the parties would be tantamount to a shifting of the place/ seat of arbitration.
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THE 1986 ACT OR THE 2019 ACT - THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES APPLICABILITY 

Introduction:

Recently, in Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.[1], the Supreme Court of India analysed and clarified the impact of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”), upon pending cases that were filed under the consumer fora, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“1986 Act”). In this regard, the Court has inter alia discussed and analysed (i) a wide range of judicial precedents, which have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings; (ii) the objects, intent, legislative scheme, and procedural history behind the consumer laws in India, particularly in terms of jurisdictional provision contained in the 2019 Act; and (iii) the relevant portions of the 2019 Act in so far as they pertain to the pecuniary jurisdiction vis-a-vis the erstwhile 1986 Act.
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LIMITATION PERIOD FOR FILING A SECTION 34 PETITION BEGINS FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE SIGNED COPY OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD

Introduction:

Recently, a division bench of the Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. V. M/s Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd.[1] has inter alia (i) clarified when the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) commences; (ii) discussed the legal requirement and significance of an award being signed; and (iii) highlighted the relevance of dissenting opinions in arbitration proceedings. The Court has also made observations on what happens to the underlying disputes between the parties after an award is set aside.
Continue Reading Limitation period for filing a Section 34 Petition begins from the Date of Receipt of the Signed Copy of the Arbitral Award

 One-Sided-Contractual-Terms-Constitute-Unfair-Trade-Practice-Under-Consumer-Law-in-India

INTRODUCTION:

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna and Ors.[1], has inter alia held that developers cannot compel apartment buyers to be bound by one-sided contractual terms. Finding such one-sided agreements oppressive, the Court has held that the same would constitute an unfair trade practice under the consumer laws in India.
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Supreme Court Clarifies that Acceptance of a Conditional Offer with a Further Condition does not Result in a Concluded Contract.

Introduction

In M/s. Padia Timber Company (P) Ltd. v. The Board of Trustees of Vishakhapatnam Port Trust[1], the Supreme Court has reiterated that the acceptance of a conditional offer with a further condition does not result in a concluded contract. The Court has observed that when the acceptor attaches a new condition while accepting the contract already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts the new condition. 
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WRITS AGAINST ORDERS PASSED BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS – THE SUPREME COURT REITERATES THE LAW SMM

 Introduction

Recently, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. and Anr[1] has observed that the High Courts’ power of interference under Articles 226[2] and 227[3] of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”), in the context of arbitral proceedings, may be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’. Clarifying the term ‘exceptional rarity’, the Court pointed out that such interference would be warranted only in cases wherein a party is left remediless under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) or clear bad faith is shown by one of the parties.
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