Photo of Aditya Mehta

Partner in the Dispute Resolution Practice at the Mumbai office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. Aditya has expertise and extensive experience in commercial litigation and arbitration (both domestic and international), handling disputes both of a general commercial nature as well as public and regulatory disputes across sectors, including financial regulation, administrative, white collar, sports, media and entertainment, food and beverage, local government, planning and environment and public sector projects. He regularly appears and argues matters before Courts (including High Courts and the Supreme Court), Tribunals and Regulatory Authorities. He can be reached at aditya.mehta@cyrilshroff.com.

Does an Arbitration Clause survive Novation of an Agreement 

Introduction:

Recently in Sanjiv Prakash v. Seema Kukreja & Ors.[1], the Delhi High Court has reiterated that novation of an agreement would necessarily result in destruction of the arbitration clause contained therein. In this regard, it was observed that an arbitration agreement being a creation of an agreement may be destroyed by agreement.

Facts of the case:

Respondent No. 3 had incorporated a company in 1971, under the name of Asian Films Laboratories Private Limited, which was subsequently renamed as ANI Media Private Limited in 1997 (“Company”). The shareholders of the said Company were Respondent No. 3’s son (“Petitioner”) and his daughter and wife (“Respondent No. 1” and “Respondent No. 2” respectively) (Petitioner and Respondents together hereinafter referred to as the “Family”). The Petitioner was the Managing Director of the Company. In 1996, Thomson Reuters Corporation Pte. Limited (“Reuters”) approached the Petitioner for a long-term equity investment in the Company on the condition that the Petitioner would play an active role in the management of the Company.
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The Final Word on the Limitation Period for Enforcement of Foreign Awards

The Supreme Court has, in its recent judgment of Government of India v. Vedanta Limited & Ors.[1], settled the law relating to limitation for filing petitions for enforcement and execution of foreign awards in India. The Court held that petitions seeking enforcement/execution of foreign awards are required to be filed within three years from the date when the right to apply accrues and in the event there is any delay in filing such petitions, the same can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”).
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The Age of the Indian Consumer

In a recent decision[1] passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, developers were directed to pay compensation in excess of the contractually stipulated amount to flat purchasers, on account of delay in handing over possession and non-fulfilment of certain representations made to them. It was also held that consumer forums established under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (CP Act, 1986), are empowered to award just and reasonable compensation (even beyond the contractually stipulated amount, wherever necessary) to alleviate the harassment and agony caused to a consumer.
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Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Requirements for admissibility of electronic evidence revisited by the Supreme Court

Background

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court recently held that the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”), is a condition  precedent to the admissibility of electronic record in evidence.[1] This judgment arose from a reference by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court, which found that the Division Bench judgment in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh[2] required reconsideration in view of the three-judge bench judgment in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer.[3]
Continue Reading Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Requirements for admissibility of electronic evidence revisited by the Supreme Court

 

Competition or unlawful contractual interference

In a recent decision, the Delhi High Court dealt with the tort of unlawful interference in contractual relationships and inter alia held that the said tort has no place in India in view of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”).[1]

Background

The developer of a certain property at Amritsar agreed to lease the said property to the Plaintiff for fifteen years, by way of a term sheet. The Plaintiff paid a security deposit to the developer as per the term sheet and proceeded to draw up the main transaction document.

Upon learning that the Defendant (a competitor of the Plaintiff) had been pursuing the developer for the purpose of entering into an agreement with respect to the same property, the Plaintiff informed the Defendant about the term sheet executed by the developer with the Plaintiff and requested the Defendant to desist from pursuing the developer. However, the Plaintiff learnt that the developer had entered into an agreement with the Defendant with respect to the said property. Soon thereafter, the Plaintiff was informed by the developer that the term sheet stood terminated on account of the Plaintiff’s failure to execute the main transaction document within the stipulated time. The developer refunded the security deposit, which was accepted by the Plaintiff without protest. The Plaintiff alleged that (a) the Defendant induced the developer to terminate the term sheet with the Plaintiff; and (b) the Defendant had similarly attempted to interfere with transactions between the Plaintiff and developers of other properties in different cities.

The Plaintiff filed a suit against the Defendant inter alia seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the Defendant from inducing a breach of any agreement between the Plaintiff and third parties in respect of non-functional properties of the Plaintiff across India.
Continue Reading Competition or unlawful contractual interference: The line continues to remain blurred

Arbitrator’s power to recall its order of termination of arbitral proceeding- A tale of Dubiety - Part II

In Part I of this post, we inter-alia attempted to highlight the law (and perhaps a relevant counter perspective) in relation to the power of the arbitrator to recall its order of termination of arbitral proceedings passed under Section 25(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). In this post, we attempt to answer whether such a remedy would extend to termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Act, and other issues incidental thereto.
Continue Reading Arbitrator’s power to recall its order of termination of arbitral proceeding- A tale of Dubiety? (Part II)

Introduction:

This article analyses the legal basis and the genesis of the power of an arbitrator to recall its order of termination of proceeding on account of default of the Claimant.

India seated arbitral proceedings, whether ad-hoc or institutional, are governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 (UNCITRAL Model Law). Whilst arbitrators are not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[1], they is usually guided by the broad principles enshrined in the said enactments, while conducting the arbitral proceedings. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC, the Court has power to recall its order. Under the said rule, if the Court is satisfied that summons was not duly served on the defendant, or that there was sufficient cause for defendant’s failure to appear when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court is empowered inter-alia to pass an order setting aside an ex- parte decree that may have been passed against the defendant.


Continue Reading Arbitrator’s power to recall its order of termination of arbitral proceeding- A tale of Dubiety? (Part I)

In Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. The Central Bank of India and Anr.[1], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified as to when the three-year limitation period contemplated under Article 113[2] of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Act), commences. It has also reiterated the importance of considering the averments made in a plaint as a whole while determining an application for rejection of plaints under Order VII Rule 11[3] of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC).


Continue Reading When does the clock of limitation start ticking for suits falling under Article 113 of the Limitation Act?

unfettered right to exclude or limit their liability for breach of contract Part 2

In Part I of this post, we had discussed the concept of exclusion or limitation of liability clauses and the position in India. In this part, we will examine the position of such clauses in England and provide our views on such clauses. 

Position in England 

The application of clauses excluding or limiting liability in England is more consistent. When faced with standard form contracts or contracts where there is inequality of bargaining power, English courts apply the test of fairness or reasonableness of clauses in such contracts and refuse to enforce provisions of contracts that are unconscionable or exploitative.[1]
Continue Reading Do parties have an unfettered right to exclude or limit their liability for breach of contract? – Part II

Do parties have an unfettered right to exclude or limit their liability for breach of contract – Part 1

Introduction

The law of damages in India is codified in Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (“Contract Act”). Section 73 of the Contract Act provides that a party that suffers breach of contract is entitled to receive from the party that has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from a breach. Section 73 of the Contract Act bars the grant of compensation for remote and indirect loss or damage sustained on account of breach of contract.

This bifurcation between damages towards losses, which naturally arise in the usual course of things (first limb) and losses that the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from a breach of the contract (second limb), appears to be borrowed from the principle laid down in the celebrated English decision of Hadley v. Baxendale.[1] The first limb is popularly referred to as general damages, whilst the second limb is referred to as special damages i.e. additional loss caused by a breach on account of special circumstances, outside the ordinary course of things, which was in the contemplation of the parties.
Continue Reading Do parties have an unfettered right to exclude or limit their liability for breach of contract? – Part I