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Associate in the Dispute Resolution Team at the Mumbai office of Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas. She can be reached at tanya.singh@cyrilshroff.com

 Supreme Court Clarifies Law On Limitation Period For Filing An Appeal Under Section 37 Of The Arbitration Act

INTRODUCTION:

The Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented by Executive Engineer v. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd.[1] has inter alia set right the law regarding the period of limitation for condonation of delay in filing appeals under Section 37[2] of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”). Overruling its earlier decision in N.V. International v. State of Assam[3] (“N.V. International”) and emphasising the central object of speedy disposal of disputes sought to be achieved by the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (“Commercial Courts Act”), the Court has allowed condonation of only ‘short delays’, setting out strict parameters for permitting the same.
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This Is the End - What Now The Aftermath of an Award being Set Aside

There is scarcely any aspect of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”), which has not seen the spectre of ad nauseum arguments and judicial pronouncements. Concepts have been devised, lauded, followed, and then set aside. Lawyers have forcefully argued for awards to be set aside, and Courts have assiduously upheld the essence and spirit of the concept of arbitration. The law has been set, and then upturned, and in this entire process, not much judicial/ legislative light seems to have fallen on the protagonist of this piece. The Act only hints at what happens after an award is set aside, and the ‘hint’ paints a somewhat grim picture. 
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Supreme Court Revisits the Venue – Seat Issue 

Introduction:

A division bench of the Supreme Court in M/s Inox Renewables Ltd. v. Jayesh Electricals Ltd.[1] has recently reiterated the decision in BSG SGS SOMA JV vs. NHPC Limited[2], equating the juridical concepts of seat and venue. In this regard, the Court has clarified that a shift in venue by mutual agreement between the parties would be tantamount to a shifting of the place/ seat of arbitration.
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THE 1986 ACT OR THE 2019 ACT - THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES APPLICABILITY 

Introduction:

Recently, in Neena Aneja & Anr. v. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd.[1], the Supreme Court of India analysed and clarified the impact of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (“2019 Act”), upon pending cases that were filed under the consumer fora, constituted under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“1986 Act”). In this regard, the Court has inter alia discussed and analysed (i) a wide range of judicial precedents, which have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings; (ii) the objects, intent, legislative scheme, and procedural history behind the consumer laws in India, particularly in terms of jurisdictional provision contained in the 2019 Act; and (iii) the relevant portions of the 2019 Act in so far as they pertain to the pecuniary jurisdiction vis-a-vis the erstwhile 1986 Act.
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LIMITATION PERIOD FOR FILING A SECTION 34 PETITION BEGINS FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE SIGNED COPY OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD

Introduction:

Recently, a division bench of the Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. V. M/s Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd.[1] has inter alia (i) clarified when the limitation period for challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) commences; (ii) discussed the legal requirement and significance of an award being signed; and (iii) highlighted the relevance of dissenting opinions in arbitration proceedings. The Court has also made observations on what happens to the underlying disputes between the parties after an award is set aside.
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 One-Sided-Contractual-Terms-Constitute-Unfair-Trade-Practice-Under-Consumer-Law-in-India

INTRODUCTION:

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna and Ors.[1], has inter alia held that developers cannot compel apartment buyers to be bound by one-sided contractual terms. Finding such one-sided agreements oppressive, the Court has held that the same would constitute an unfair trade practice under the consumer laws in India.
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WRITS AGAINST ORDERS PASSED BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS – THE SUPREME COURT REITERATES THE LAW SMM

 Introduction

Recently, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. and Anr[1] has observed that the High Courts’ power of interference under Articles 226[2] and 227[3] of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”), in the context of arbitral proceedings, may be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’. Clarifying the term ‘exceptional rarity’, the Court pointed out that such interference would be warranted only in cases wherein a party is left remediless under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) or clear bad faith is shown by one of the parties.
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Time is of the essence for registration of a lease

INTRODUCTION

More often than not, the central procedural question on the minds of parties entering into a lease deed is whether the registration thereof is mandatory. This central query pervades the gamut of situations ranging from lease of residential to commercial properties, and from short-term to long-term leases.

The law governing registration of lease deeds is primarily contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (“Registration Act”) and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TOPA”). A lease of an immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms as defined in Section 105 of TOPA. According to the Registration Act, ‘lease includes a counterpart, kabuliyat, an undertaking to cultivate or occupy, and an agreement to lease[1]’.
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The Supreme Court Revisits the Consequences of Non-Payment of Stamp Duty on the Arbitration Agreement – Part I

In Part I of this post, we discussed the findings of the Court on the issue of separability of arbitration agreements from the underlying contract and the corresponding validity of arbitration agreements in unstamped agreements. In this part, we will analyse the findings of the Court with respect to arbitrability of disputes involving fraud; and

The Supreme Court Revisits the Consequences of Non-Payment of Stamp Duty on the Arbitration Agreement – Part I

Introduction

Recently, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in M/s N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Others[1] has reiterated and clarified the law on the (i) doctrine of separability of arbitration agreements from the underlying contract; (ii) arbitrability of disputes involving fraud; and (iii) maintainability of a writ petition against orders passed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”).
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