By utilising its powers under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court of India has delivered an unprecedented decision on August 09, 2018 in Chitra Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors[1]., and other connected matters (the Jaypee / homebuyers Case)[2]. In this era of evolving jurisprudence on the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Supreme Court, by this landmark decision, has settled some highly debated issues with respect to its implementation and has provided much required certainty. This has been achieved by the Supreme Court paving the way to reset the clock by re-commencing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).

Continue Reading Resetting the Clock: Supreme Court Sends Jaypee Infratech Limited Back to NCLT for CIRP

The Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 (2015 Amendment) came into force with effect from October 23, 2015. Although this amendment was enacted to remove controversies and iron out wrinkles in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (Parent Act), it has in fact, given rise to its own set of controversies. One of the burning issues was the applicability of the 2015 Amendment. Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment provides for its applicability, and reads as follows:

  1. Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the arbitral proceedings commenced, in accordance with the provisions of Section 21 of the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act unless the parties otherwise agree but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings commenced on or after the date of commencement of this Act.

One would believe that the above provision would have settled any issue of applicability of the 2015 Amendment. It has instead given rise to more litigation,[i] which has now been partially addressed by the Supreme Court.[ii]

The controversy in all the litigation that came up before the High Courts, and which also saw conflicting points of view, was around the applicability of the amended Section 36 of the Parent Act. In the pre-amendment era, when an award debtor challenged an award under Section 34, the award creditor was prevented from enforcing the award until a determination had been made by a court on the challenge, because of an ‘automatic stay’ on the operation of the award.

In order to overcome this, and for the benefit of award creditors, Section 36 of the Parent Act, was amended to do away with this ‘automatic stay’. It required the challenging party to separately apply for a stay and also required the court to direct the award debtor to deposit the award amount, so as to avoid frivolous challenges. The question for the courts has been the applicability of the amended Section 36 to Section 34 applications that were filed before and after the 2015 Amendment came into force.

Continue Reading BCCI v. Kochi Cricket: Supreme Court’s Much Needed Third Umpire Decision

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This is the sixth blog piece in our series entitled “Those Were the Days”, which is published monthly. We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


The need for “rule of law” to prevail is repeatedly espoused by today’s social and political commentators. In light of this, it is important to revisit the origin of the doctrine of “rule of law”, and understand how it originated, so as to fully appreciate its significance and meaning.

In 1676, Sir Mathew Hale, the then Chief Justice of King’s Bench (1671-76), set out 18 tenets for dispensing of justice. The sixth tenet read as follows,

“That I suffer not myself to be possessed with any judgment at all till the whole business of both parties be heard.”

This very sound principle has two fundamental requirements.

The first is that the judge ought not to be predisposed to either one of the adversarial parties, and should not form a view on the merits of the matter before him until all the parties are heard. This of course is very difficult to do given that all persons including judges are bound to have their own views, opinions and preferences. However, through the ages the hallmark of an eminent member of the judiciary is the manner in which he/she overcomes inherent prejudices so as to ensure that the judicial adjudication is based only on the law, the facts based only on evidence on record before the court, and the interplay of the facts in relation to the law.

Continue Reading The Principles of Natural Justice – Origin and Relevance

The Central Government in India had introduced the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (“PMLA”), to prevent the circulation of laundered money. The Act defines money laundering as any process or activity connected to proceeds of crime, including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as legitimate property. While the PMLA Act allowed for confiscation and seizure of properties obtained from the laundered money, such actions were still subject to the processes of criminal prosecution. This led to many of the persons accused of money laundering, to flee the jurisdiction of Indian courts to avoid criminal prosecution under PMLA and the consequent confiscation of the properties.

On March 12, 2018, the Indian government introduced the Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill, 2018 (“Bill/Proposed Act”), in the Lok Sabha, after receiving approval from the Cabinet, to address the issue of such economic offenders avoiding criminal prosecution. The Bill defines a ‘fugitive economic offender’ as any individual against whom a warrant for arrest in relation to economic offences, under various statutes, listed in a schedule to the Bill (“Scheduled Offence”) has been issued, on or after the enactment of this Bill, by any Indian court, and who:

  • Has left India to avoid criminal prosecution, or
  • Being abroad refuses to return to India to face criminal prosecution.

Pertinently, in 2015, the definition of proceeds of crime in the PMLA was amended to include property equivalent to proceeds of crime held outside the country.

Continue Reading Fugitive Economic Offenders Bill, 2018

The Union Cabinet recently issued a press release for the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2018 (“2018 Bill”). The amendments which, when passed will apply to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act”) are pursuant to the Srikrishna Committee Report[1] released in July, 2017 (“Report”), recommending further amendments on the back of the 2015 amendments, primarily to improve on or clarify various provisions.

Key amendments approved include the following:

  • Arbitration Council of India

The Report recommended the creation of an independent body to accredit arbitral institutions and arbitrators as a number of stakeholders interviewed were disenchanted with the existing arbitral facilities in India. The recommendation has been accepted and an independent body will be set up, namely, the Arbitration Council of India to enable formal evaluation and accreditation. This Council will frame norms for alternate dispute resolution and evolve professional guidelines. This is a positive step to ensure the quality of arbitral institutions. Though India has several arbitral institutions, few apart from the Mumbai Centre for International Arbitration are recognized as having the expertise to administer multi-party international arbitrations.

Continue Reading The Supreme Court on the 2015 Amendments and the Cabinet on the 2018 Arbitration Amendments – Good for India?

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This is the fifth blog piece in our series entitled “Those Were the Days”, which is published monthly. We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


India’s judiciary has been known for judicial activism with the Supreme Court often deciding to intervene, not just to strike down laws that are held to be unconstitutional, but also in governance, which many believe ought to be the exclusive domain of the executive. While opinion is divided about the desirability of judicial activism, most would agree that it is the judiciary and its fearless will to intervene and deliver justice, even at the risk of stepping into the domain of the legislature or the executive, which has preserved democratic process over the years.

Unfortunately, rampant judicial activism has given rise to an inevitable debate about the balance of powers between the “three pillars of democracy” and then, as a corollary, the question of the manner in which Judges are appointed in the first place. The prevalent “Collegium System” has been severely criticised, as being non-transparent and prone to nepotism, with several jurists and respected members of the bar themselves pointing out that in no other large democracy does an institution so powerful, choose its own members. The time is therefore right to look closely at the history of how the “Collegium System” evolved, through what is known as the Three Judges Cases.

Continue Reading Should the Judges Cases be Revisited?

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This is the fourth blog piece in our series entitled “Those Were the Days”, which is published monthly. We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


The world is becoming corporatised, and the time of the business owner living over his little shop are well-nigh over. The world is also becoming smaller and, as it does, a business’s reach spreads across multiple jurisdictions and through multiple subsidiary or group companies.

In this age of corporatisation, most jurisdictions recognise the concept of a company as a separate juristic person, with an identity distinct and independent of its shareholders, members or directors. This corporate existence separates a company’s identity from that of its promoters or shareholders. It enables the company to contract in its own name, with its shareholders and third parties, to acquire and hold property in its own name, and to sue and be sued in its own name. A company has perpetual succession; its life is not co-dependent with that of its shareholders and it remains in existence irrespective of any change in its members, until it is dissolved by liquidation. The shareholders of a company are not identified with the company and cannot be held personally liable for acts undertaken by, or liabilities of, the company.

This independence or distinction is not a new concept. In the late 19th Century, the judgment in the classic case of Salomon v. Salomon[1] was passed, ruling that a company is a separate legal entity distinct from its members and so insulating Mr. Salomon, the founder of A. Salomon and Company, Ltd., from personal liability to the creditors of the company he founded.

Continue Reading LIC v. Escorts and Beyond – Lifting the Corporate Veil

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Published here is Part II of the blog piece on the Indra Sawhney Case, which examines in-depth, the case of Indra Sawhney, the use of ‘caste’ as a factor in determining backwardness for the purpose of reservation, and the delicate balance between the needs of the society and the constitutional vision.  

We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


II.  The Mandal Commission and the case of Indra Sawhney

A. The Mandal Commission and its Recommendations

In the year 1979, the Second Backward Classes Commission (Mandal Commission) was set up which was tasked with, inter alia, determining the criteria for defining the socially and educationally backward classes. After an exhaustive survey, the Mandal Commission identified 52% of the Indian population as “Socially and Economically Backward Classes” (SEBCs). Subsequently, it recommended a 27% reservation for SEBCs in addition to the previously existing 22.5% reservation for SC/STs.

In the year 1990, Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced that his government would implement reservations on the basis of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission.[1] Two office memoranda, O.M. No. 36012/13/90-Estt (SCT) dated August 13, 1990 as amended by O.M. No. 36012/13/90-Estt(SCT) dated September 25, 1990 sought to enforce these recommendations. The decision sparked widespread controversy and led to thousands of students coming out onto the streets to protest against the decision. There was a complete breakdown of law and order and some students even immolated themselves.[2]

Continue Reading Casteism Much? – An Analysis of Indra Sawhney: Part II

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This is the third blog piece in our series entitled “Those Were the Days”, which is published monthly. 

This is a two-part piece which analyses the Indra Sawhney Case – a case that is famous for both settling several issues and unsettling several others in the great Indian backward-class-reservation jurisprudence. Published here is Part I of the piece, which examines the legal history of affirmative action in India.   

We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


The “Mandal Commission Report” and the controversy that followed it, is etched in the memory of every Indian. By upholding the implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the Apex Court judgment in the case of Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, established a central role for itself in every debate on the sensitive issue of reservations in India.

One of the avowed objectives of the Indian Constitution is the creation of an egalitarian society, including, and especially, by way of the eradication of caste and the caste system. In support of this objective, several successive governments have devised various affirmative action policies to eradicate caste and support the social mobility of backward classes. These measures typically include reserving seats in representative and educational institutions or public employment for members of certain classes that have been traditionally and historically marginalised. However, over time, these measures have become a tool for populism and to appease certain communities. Therefore, every time such a measure is introduced, it has resulted in dividing public opinion and caused widespread controversy. On some occasions, this divide has escalated into public demonstrations and even riots, for or against reservation.[1]

When these hotly contested measures have come up for adjudication, the judiciary’s role has not been easy; it has to account for social realities, while simultaneously grounding its decision within the sacred framework of the Constitution. One recurrent controversy that has arisen on multiple occasions before the Apex Court is the criteria for determining backwardness in order to qualify for reservation. There have been several cases that directly deal with this question. Of these, the most significant is the 1992 decision of by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1992) Supp. (3) SCC 217 [2] (Indra Sawhney).

Continue Reading Casteism Much? – An Analysis of Indra Sawhney: Part I

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This is the second piece in our series entitled “Those Were the Days”, which is published monthly. We hope you enjoy reading this as much as we have enjoyed putting this together.


This post deals with Securities Exchange Board of India’s (SEBI) interpretation of the term “Unpublished Price Sensitive Information” (UPSI) arising from the alleged insider trading by Hindustan Lever Limited (now Hindustan Unilever Limited) (HLL) in its purchase of shares of Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited (BBLIL).

While the subject SEBI order employed provisions of the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992 (1992 Regulations), this post also analyses the relevant provisions of the subsequently notified SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading) Regulations, 2015 (2015 Regulations) in relation the subject case.

Case Analysis: Hindustan Lever Limited v. SEBI[1]

The facts of the case concerned the purchase by HLL of 8 lakh shares of BBLIL from the Unit Trust of India (UTI) on March 25, 1996. This purchase was made barely two weeks prior to a public announcement for a proposed merger of HLL with BBLIL.

Continue Reading Insider Trading: Hindustan Lever Limited v. SEBI