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RPT Disclosure Standards: Regulator’s Ongoing Quest for Balance

Context

The law on related party transactions (“RPTs”) has been evolving since its inclusion in the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”), and the introduction of stricter regulations for listed companies by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI” or “Regulator”) in the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, 2015 (“LODR”). Yet, India Inc. continues to falter in its battle for good governance because of abusive RPTs, inadequate disclosures, and diversion of funds of listed companies to closely held promoter entities through innovative structures and shell entities – exacerbated because promoters own or control 75 per cent of listed entities in India.Continue Reading RPT Disclosure Standards: Regulator’s Ongoing Quest for Balance

Background

Section 58(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), read along with its proviso, lays down that while the shares of a public company are freely transferable, any contract or arrangement entered into between two or more persons for the transfer of securities shall be enforceable as a contract.Continue Reading Can An Issuer Public Company Restrict the Transferability of Shares?

The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability of Auditors: Delhi HC Judgment in Deloitte v. Union of India

Background

India’s evolving financial reporting system has made robust corporate governance mechanisms indispensable. The need for heightened financial reporting mechanisms was first felt after the country was rocked by multiple corporate scandals, specifically 2009’s Satyam Computer scam. The scam exposed numerous auditing-related issues, namely, the manipulative practices of auditors, inadequacy of regulatory oversight in accounting and auditing standards, and the importance of accountability of the professional conduct of auditors. It also raised crucial questions related to the independence and effectiveness of auditors. Against this backdrop, there was a reverberating demand for stronger institutional frameworks to regulate and supervise accounting and auditing standards in the country. It became imperative to set up an autonomous body for financial reporting to attract foreign investment and elevate public confidence in the financials of investee companies, leading to the establishment of the National Financial Reporting Authority (“NFRA”).Continue Reading The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability of Auditors: Delhi HC Judgment in Deloitte v. Union of India

Removal of Managing Director: Legal Position and Practical Challenges

Context

A managing director (“MD”) is the principal executive officer of a company, serving on its Board in an executive capacity and is at the helm of its affairs. He is primarily responsible for managing the day-to-day affairs of the company under the overall ‘superintendence, control and direction’ of the Board.Continue Reading Removal of Managing Director: Legal Position and Practical Challenges

Background and Introduction

An “independent director” (“ID”) is defined as “an independent director referred to in sub-section (6) of section 149”,[1] where Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), clarifies that an ID is “a director other than a managing director or a whole-time director or a nominee director” of the company. To be appointed as an ID, a person must fulfil an elaborate set of objective and subjective criteria separated across equity unlisted and listed companies. Continue Reading Sufficiency of extant law to address governance concerns in relation to “independence” of an independent director in relation to subsequent directorships with the company

Evaluating the Contours of Permissible Remuneration for directors of a company in India

Background and Introduction

All companies incorporated in India are mandated to constitute a board of directors,[1] to which companies appoint different kinds and classes of directors – managing director (“MD”), independent director (“ID”), non-executive and non-independent director (“NED”), whole time director (“WTD”) or executive director (“ED”). Given the pivotal role that a company’s directors play in the governance and operations of companies, the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), regulates different facets of a directorship from the appointment, duties, and responsibilities to the remuneration. This blog discusses the contours of remuneration limits to evaluate the length and breadth of permissible director remuneration. “Remuneration” has been defined as “any money or its equivalent given or passed to any person for services rendered by him and includes perquisites as defined under the Income-tax Act, 1961[2]”.[3]Continue Reading Evaluating the Contours of Permissible Remuneration for directors of a company in India

Adding an ‘E’ to the (E)-Adjudication Process under Companies Act

Introduction

“Compliances” are inevitable certainties for companies. The provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”) and various rules formulated under it prescribe the various compliances and the way companies[1] must fulfil them. The Act provides for 4 (four) meetings of the board of directors to be held in a year[2]and…

True and Fair View of Financial Statements: Who will finally bell the cat?

One of the most important communications by a company to its shareholders is its financial statements. It is a key document on which shareholders rely while making their decision on whether to stay invested in a company or not, as it highlights the financial health of the company. The regulators also understand the importance of financial statements, due to which the issuance of the same is heavily regulated and scrutinized. Section 129 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“CA 2013”), provides that the financial statements shall give a ‘true and fair view’ of the state of affairs of a company, while also complying with the accounting standards notified under Section 133 and be in the form as provided in Schedule III of CA 2013.Continue Reading True and Fair View of Financial Statements: Who will finally bell the cat?

A Fine Balance: A Perspective on recent RoC Orders

Introduction

India is in its “vocal for local” and “ease of doing business” (“EoDB”) era. Yet the slew of show cause notices and penalty orders the jurisdictional registrar of companies (“RoC”) has issued against Indian companies and its directors in the recent past[1] for alleged non-compliance of significant beneficial ownership (“SBO”) disclosures,[2] corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) contributions,[3] etc. under the Companies Act, 2013 (“Companies Act”), reflect the need for a well-balanced system.Continue Reading A Fine Balance: A Perspective on recent RoC Orders

Is the NCLT’s approach in the Philips India case too literal?

Introduction

The Kolkata Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”), on September 19, 2024, dismissed an application filed under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Companies Act”), in Philips India Limited[1] (the “Order”), on the grounds that Section 66 of the Companies Act cannot be invoked for capital reduction when the circumstances mentioned in Section 66(a) or 66(b) of the Companies Act are not met. The NCLT held that Section 66, which provides for reduction of share capital, cannot be used merely to provide liquidity or exit to minority shareholders, or to save on administrative costs. The Order attempts to justify the same on the grounds that the proposed share capital reduction was only incidental to the main objective of buy-back of shares.[2] However, this observation is in stark contrast to a catena of NCLT and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (“NCLAT”) orders, as well as decisions of various High Courts that have time and again noted that a company may reduce its share capital in any manner as it deems fit, and courts have limited role in such schemes of capital reduction.Continue Reading Is the NCLT’s approach in the Philips India case too literal?