The enactment of the SEBI Act in 1992 (“SEBI Act”), followed by the amendment of Section 21 of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (“SCRA”), empowered the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) to regulate the process of listing of securities by public companies.Continue Reading Ten Years of LODR: The Journey from “Minimum Principles” to “Maximum Prescriptions”
Alternative investment funds (“AIF”) being considered an investment avenue for sophisticated investors with high risk-appetite and ticket-size, are subject to certain restraints in their marketing and placement to keep it restricted to the intended investors. The Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) (Alternative Investment Funds) Regulations, 2012 (“AIF Regulations”) define an AIF as[1] “a privately pooled investment vehicle which collects funds from investors, whether Indian or foreign, for investing it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of its investors…”. Regulation 11[2] further provides that an “AIF shall raise funds through private placement by issue of information memorandum or placement memorandum, by whatever name called”. Moreover, it has been provided[3] that no scheme of an AIF shall have more than 1000 investors and where an AIF is set-up as a company, the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 shall apply.[4]Continue Reading AIF Marketing in India: What Fund Managers Must Know
The Companies Act, 2013 (“CA 2013”) defines a director as a person who has been appointed to the Board of a company[1]. Directors typically have various duties and obligations towards the company, shareholders and all other stakeholders. They are also subject to civil and criminal liability under CA 2013, as well as under various other statutes, which have a standard vicarious liability clause for directors and officers of the company. In this context, another concept that emerges is of a “shadow director” or a “deemed director” who is a person not officially appointed to the Board but on whose instructions and directions the Board is accustomed to act upon. In this blog, we analyse the legal position surrounding “shadow directors” in India and the United Kingdom (“UK”).Continue Reading Unseen Influence of Shadow Directors: Does it compromise corporate governance?
Regulation 6(1) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015 (“SEBI LODR Regulations”), requires every listed entity to appoint a company secretary as a compliance officer. The responsibilities of such an officer includes, among other things, ensuring compliance with regulations, coordinating with relevant authorities, verifying accuracy of submissions, and overseeing grievance redressal mechanisms. On April 1, 2025, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) released a clarification[1] on the position of the compliance officer in terms of Regulation 6 of the SEBI LODR.[2]Continue Reading “One Level Below”: Clarifying the Hierarchical Position of the Compliance Officer under SEBI LODR Regulations
India Inc’s initial public offering (“IPO”) landscape has witnessed significant growth in recent years, with numerous companies entering the capital markets to fund their growth and offer exits to existing investors. An IPO in India requires navigating a complex regulatory framework, complying with various provisions, and addressing stakeholders’ interests, including employees with stock options. In our post[1], we had assessed companies’ eligibility to undertake an IPO in situations where any individual holds rights entitling them to acquire equity shares of the company, or where there are any outstanding convertible securities that can be converted into the company’s equity shares.Continue Reading Amendment to make companies with outstanding Stock Appreciation Rights IPO eligible: A few steps closer, but not there yet
The law on related party transactions (“RPTs”) has been evolving since its inclusion in the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”), and the introduction of stricter regulations for listed companies by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI” or “Regulator”) in the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements Regulations, 2015 (“LODR”). Yet, India Inc. continues to falter in its battle for good governance because of abusive RPTs, inadequate disclosures, and diversion of funds of listed companies to closely held promoter entities through innovative structures and shell entities – exacerbated because promoters own or control 75 per cent of listed entities in India.Continue Reading RPT Disclosure Standards: Regulator’s Ongoing Quest for Balance
Section 58(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), read along with its proviso, lays down that while the shares of a public company are freely transferable, any contract or arrangement entered into between two or more persons for the transfer of securities shall be enforceable as a contract.Continue Reading Can An Issuer Public Company Restrict the Transferability of Shares?
India’s evolving financial reporting system has made robust corporate governance mechanisms indispensable. The need for heightened financial reporting mechanisms was first felt after the country was rocked by multiple corporate scandals, specifically 2009’s Satyam Computer scam. The scam exposed numerous auditing-related issues, namely, the manipulative practices of auditors, inadequacy of regulatory oversight in accounting and auditing standards, and the importance of accountability of the professional conduct of auditors. It also raised crucial questions related to the independence and effectiveness of auditors. Against this backdrop, there was a reverberating demand for stronger institutional frameworks to regulate and supervise accounting and auditing standards in the country. It became imperative to set up an autonomous body for financial reporting to attract foreign investment and elevate public confidence in the financials of investee companies, leading to the establishment of the National Financial Reporting Authority (“NFRA”).Continue Reading The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability of Auditors: Delhi HC Judgment in Deloitte v. Union of India
A managing director (“MD”) is the principal executive officer of a company, serving on its Board in an executive capacity and is at the helm of its affairs. He is primarily responsible for managing the day-to-day affairs of the company under the overall ‘superintendence, control and direction’ of the Board.Continue Reading Removal of Managing Director: Legal Position and Practical Challenges
An “independent director” (“ID”) is defined as “an independent director referred to in sub-section (6) of section 149”,[1] where Section 149(6) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), clarifies that an ID is “a director other than a managing director or a whole-time director or a nominee director” of the company. To be appointed as an ID, a person must fulfil an elaborate set of objective and subjective criteria separated across equity unlisted and listed companies. Continue Reading Sufficiency of extant law to address governance concerns in relation to “independence” of an independent director in relation to subsequent directorships with the company