Companies Act

Summary: Indian corporate governance law pulls independent directors in two directions. Schedule IV to the Companies Act, 2013, requires them to keep out of day-to-day management. At the same time, a recent line of orders from SEBI and the Securities Appellate Tribunal demands closer diligence from independent directors on audit committees. The boundary between the two, the Lakshman Rekha, turns not on how much an independent director engages but on the channel and character of that engagement. Diligence is about the quality of oversight. Overreach begins the moment an independent director substitutes their own judgement for management’s in executing a decision. A related difficulty concerns independent directors who serve as managing directors elsewhere and carry their executive instincts into boardrooms where they are meant to oversee only. The shift from an executive to a non-executive mindset usually takes years, and that lag is a complication Boards cannot afford to ignore.

Continue Reading The Lakshman Rekha for Independent Directors: Board Oversight versus Operational Overreach
Rule 9B in Action: Practical Enforcement of Dematerialisation Requirements in Private Companies

Summary: This article examines a recent adjudication order passed by the Registrar of Companies, Bangalore against a private company for effecting a transfer of shares without prior dematerialisation i.e., in contravention of Rule 9B of the Companies (Prospectus and Allotment of Securities) Rules, 2014. It analyses the governing framework under Rules 9A and 9B, the factual circumstances of the non-compliance, and the penalty imposed under Section 450 of the Companies Act, 2013. The article highlights key observations from the order, including the regulator’s silence on the validity of the impugned transfer and the limited scope of adjudication, and considers the broader implications of the same.

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Summary: This article examines the legal framework in India relevant to misuse of corporate opportunities by directors and its implications for investors pursuing multiple opportunities. It also discusses reforms needed in Indian law and use of transaction documents to strengthen compliance and prevent misuse.

Continue Reading The Fine Road Between Opportunity And Compliance: India’s Corporate Opportunity Doctrine
An Insolvency Regulator as Valuation Authority? Rethinking Clause 73 of Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Summary: Clause 73 would make the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India the country’s statutory Valuation Authority. The profession needs a regulator, but the insolvency regulator may be the wrong home for it, as India’s own expert committee and the practice of comparable jurisdictions suggest.

Continue Reading An Insolvency Regulator as Valuation Authority? Rethinking Clause 73 of Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026
NFRA Reimagined: What the 2026 Amendment Bill means for Boards, Audit Committees, and Auditors

Summary: NFRA is fast becoming the new benchmark of governance for audit quality, financial reporting and audit committee oversight. This blog examines how the Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposes to strengthen NFRA’s framework, why this matters for boards, audit committees, in-house counsel and auditors, and what companies should do to prepare.

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Listing of Insurance Brokers in India: The Need for an Explicit Framework

Summary: The blog notes that while India’s insurance framework does not prohibit broker listings, due to the absence of explicit IRDAI guidance, the insurance brokers may have limited access to public markets. While recent reforms (such as perpetual registration) address some hurdles, the 25% investor cap under brokers regulations may create a tension with SEBI’s minimum public float requirement. The piece suggests that it may be helpful for IRDAI to consider a clear, conditions-based listing framework for brokers, drawing on existing models for insurers and the proposed pathway for TPAs.

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Procuring Investor Consent by AIFs: SEBI’s New Playbook for Voting and Conflict Management

Summary: On June 30, 2026, SEBI released a consultation paper proposing a standardised consent mechanism and an expanded conflict-of-interest framework for Alternative Investment Funds.

The AIF Regulations mandate investor consent for material decisions but are silent on methodology, resulting in inconsistent market practices. SEBI now proposes a framework offering AIFs a choice among three voting methods – Deemed Consent, Present and Voting, and Express Voting. Further, the current “associate” definition, anchored to a 15% shareholding threshold, fails to capture transactions where conflict is self-evident. SEBI proposes introducing a “related party” definition adapted from Section 2(76) of the Companies Act, 2013, deployed specifically within conflict provisions. This widens the net of transactions requiring 75% investor approval.

Continue Reading Procuring Investor Consent by AIFs: SEBI’s New Playbook for Voting and Conflict Management
Interested, Yet Exempt: The Internal Contradiction Within Section 184 of the Companies Act, 2013

Summary: Section 184 of the Companies Act, 2013, governs a director’s duty to disclose his interest in contracts entered into by his company. While it broadly replaced Section 299 of the Companies Act, 1956, Section 184 introduces a notable narrowing of disclosure obligations and, more critically, an internal contradiction. The two per cent shareholding exemption in Section 184(5)(b) is drawn almost verbatim from the 1956 Act, yet it now collides with a status-based test introduced for the first time in Section 184(2)(a), which deems a director interested by virtue of being a promoter, manager or chief executive officer of the counterparty body corporate, irrespective of his shareholding. This blog examines that contradiction, traces it to its legislative origins, and argues that harmonious construction requires status-based obligation to prevail.

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IRDAI sets up performance scorecard for KMPs: A case for indirect enforcement

The IRDAI published a circular on Remuneration to Key Management Persons, dated May 25, 2026 (“Circular”). This was soon after a concept paper revisiting the remuneration of Key Managerial Personnel (“KMP”) of Indian insurers was shared among a select group of stakeholders, inviting their comments. The Circular, which is now applicable law, amends the IRDAI Master Circular on Corporate Governance for Insurers, 2024 (“Master Circular”). The Circular has been issued in exercise of powers under Section 34 of the Insurance Act, 1938, Section 14 of the IRDA Act, 1999, and Regulation 12 of the Regulations.

Continue Reading IRDAI sets up performance scorecard for KMPs: A case for indirect enforcement

Summary: SEBI’s recent informal guidance on the appointment of an independent director related to a promoter group member has reignited the debate on the meaning of “independence” in corporate governance. While the guidance adopts a strict interpretation of the statutory definition of “relative” under the Companies Act, 2013, it raises broader questions about whether formal legal criteria adequately capture concerns of influence and objectivity. This article examines the guidance note in the context of the legislative framework governing independent directors and compares it with the views expressed by key committees on corporate governance. It argues that the effectiveness of independent directors depends not only on compliance with prescribed objective eligibility requirements but also on preserving the substantive spirit of independence that underpins the institution.

Continue Reading Independent Directors and The Boundaries of Independence: Reflections on SEBI’s Recent Informal Guidance