Managerial Remuneration

Managerial Remuneration – Should Promoters Be Disenfranchised?

Historical Context

The Government of India’s socialistic approach towards controlling managerial remuneration between 1960s and 1990s has been a painful chapter in the history of India’s company law. While the restriction applied only to those on the board of directors, the limits the then Department of Company Affairs had prescribed in its administrative guidelines under the Companies Act, 1956 in November 1969 was as low as INR 7,500 per month and further reduced to INR 5000 per month years later. Any payment beyond those limits required the Central Government’s approval, which was also a very cumbersome and time-consuming process. This led to the unhealthy practice of compensating Managing Directors and Executive Directors (“MD/EDs”) with cash reimbursements and many other inappropriate methods. Some MDs/ EDs also stepped down from the board to accept positions one level below the board. They were designated as presidents and vice presidents despite performing the role of the Managing Director.Continue Reading Managerial Remuneration – Should Promoters Be Disenfranchised?

New Remuneration Regime for Independent Directors - Will It help in attracting better talent on the boards of India Inc

Recently, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (‘MCA’) has notified the amendments made to Sections 149(9) and 197(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’) by the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2020 (‘2020 Amendment’) -to enable companies faced with absence or inadequacy of profits to pay certain minimum guaranteed remuneration to Non-Executive Directors (‘NEDs’) and Independent Directors (‘IDs’), as may be prescribed. On the same day, the MCA also issued a Notification to amend Schedule V of the 2013 Act to prescribe the scale of remuneration which can be paid to NEDs and IDs, depending on the effective capital of the company.
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Computation of ‘net profits’ for Managerial Remuneration – Has this provision outlived its utility


Section 198 of the Companies Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’), prescribes a special method for computation of ‘net profits’ of a company in a financial year — which has different rules for arriving at net profit than the one prescribed under Accounting Standards.

The special methodology for computation of net profits prescribed under Section 198 is used for two purposes – (i) for determining managerial remuneration under Section 197 and Schedule V; and (ii) for determining the minimum CSR amount to be spent by the company in a financial year, under Section 135(5) of the 2013 Act.
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ESOPS as Managerial Remuneration - Do Regulators Need to Revisit Regulatory Architecture

Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOPs) are a well-recognised method of compensating employees and attracting and retaining the best talent. Compensation in the form of equity shares helps in creating a sense of ownership in the mind of employees. Benefit schemes for employees, including ESOPs, have gained popularity, especially in technology start-ups that have limited financial resources in the initial years, but want to attract the best talent. ESOPs are the option or a right, but not an obligation, which is offered by a company to its employees to purchase its shares at a pre-determined price in the future. ESOPs align the interest of the employees with long term interest of the companies and play a vital role in retaining employees at the growing stage of the company.

Section 2(37) of the Companies Act, 2013 (“Act”), defines ‘employees’ stock option’ as the option given to directors, officers or employees of a company or of its holding company or subsidiary company or companies, if any, which gives such directors, officers or employees, the benefit or right to purchase, or to subscribe for, the shares of the company at a future date at a pre-determined price. The Act expressly prohibits ESOPs for Independent Directors[1] as the law makers believe that it compromises the ‘independence’ of such Independent Directors. Section 62(1)(b) of the Act provides for the approval of shareholders by a special resolution. Rule 12 of the Companies (Share Capital & Debentures) Rules, 2014, lays down the legal framework for issuance of ESOPs for unlisted companies. Listed companies having ESOP plans are required to comply with the SEBI (Share Based Employee Benefits) Regulations, 2014 (“ESOP Regulations”).
Continue Reading ESOPS as Managerial Remuneration: Do Regulators Need to Revisit Regulatory Architecture?