Supreme court of India

Extra-territorial application of India’s securities law – Has SEBI cast its net too wide?

If a connection exists, it is for the Legislature to decide how far it should go in the exercise of its powers.[1]

Introduction

The territorial application of laws made by Parliament is enshrined in Article 245 of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”). The universal presumption that laws made by a country are limited to its own territorial borders, is provided under Article 245(1) of the Constitution, which provides that “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India.” However, Article 245(2) of the Constitution carves out a specific exception providing that a law made by Parliament, pursuant to Article 245(1), shall not be invalidated on the ground that such a law would have extra-territorial operation. Most countries have enacted extra-territorial laws with the US being the clear leader in this regard having enacted anti-corruption law, securities laws etc. which have extra-territorial application.


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Supreme court reiterates that courts DO not sit in appeal over an award passed by an arbitrator

INTRODUCTION:

Recently, in NTPC v. M/s Deconar Services Pvt. Ltd.[1], a three judge bench of the Supreme Court has, in line with the settled principle of minimum interference in arbitral awards, inter alia reiterated that in order to succeed in a challenge against an arbitral award, the party challenging the award must show that the arbitrator’s award suffered from perversity; or an error of law; or that the arbitrator had otherwise misconducted himself. The Court highlighted that merely showing that there is another reasonable interpretation or possible view on the basis of the material on record is insufficient to allow interference by the Court.
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LEARNING TO SPRINT SUPREME COURT ISSUES DIRECTIONS TO REDUCE DELAY IN DISPOSING EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS

I. Introduction:

  1. In the past decade, the Indian judiciary has been globally recognized for its historic rulings. However, even such successes, more often than not, are tainted because of the time that goes by, in passing the final ruling in a case. Justice delayed is justice denied, as the adage goes. Delay is so integral to judicial proceedings in India that it not only effects litigants initiating legal proceedings, but also plagues the minds of decree holders who have painstakingly gone through the entire lifecycle of a litigation. Even armed with a decree, a litigant must once again fight an already conquered battle before the executing court.
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Supreme Court on Section 482 CrPC - Have the inherent powers of High Courts been diluted

Recently, in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra[1] (“Neeharika Infrastructure”) a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court (“SC”) pronounced a detailed judgment on the powers of the High Court (“HC”), while adjudicating a petition for quashing of the FIR – filed under Section 482 of

Evidentiary value of Parliamentary Committee Reports 

In Kalpana Mehta v Union of India (‘Kalpana Mehta judgment’)[1], a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (‘SC’) pronounced a detailed judgment on whether Courts can place reliance on the Report of a Parliamentary Standing Committee (‘PSC’). The SC also examined whether the factual observations made in a PSC Report can be contested or challenged by the parties, during a judicial proceeding.

This decision arose from a referral order issued by a two-judge bench of the SC. The two-judge bench took the view that this was a ‘substantial question of law’ – that should be adjudicated by a Constitution Bench in accordance with Article 145(3) of the Constitution. While the Constitution Bench took a unanimous view, three separate concurring opinions were issued by Justice Dipak Misra, Justice Dr. D Y Chandrachud and Justice Ashok Bhushan.
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WRITS AGAINST ORDERS PASSED BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS – THE SUPREME COURT REITERATES THE LAW SMM

 Introduction

Recently, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Bhaven Construction v. Executive Engineer Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam Ltd. and Anr[1] has observed that the High Courts’ power of interference under Articles 226[2] and 227[3] of the Constitution of India (“Constitution”), in the context of arbitral proceedings, may be exercised in ‘exceptional rarity’. Clarifying the term ‘exceptional rarity’, the Court pointed out that such interference would be warranted only in cases wherein a party is left remediless under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) or clear bad faith is shown by one of the parties.
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Supreme Court on the admissibility of electronic evidence under Section 65B of the Evidence Act.

The recent instances of leakage of Whatsapp chats obtained during the course of investigation and their admissibility as evidence in a criminal trial has brought the issue of electronic evidence to the forefront. These Whatsapp chats have been leaked in the public domain at the investigation stage itself, even before the commencement of the trial. Considering these recent developments, the legal framework for electronic evidence merits further scrutiny.

Under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 65B prescribes a distinct framework that governs the admissibility of electronic evidence. There have been multiple litigations over the scope and ambit of Section 65B, with divergent views taken by the Apex Court.
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Automatic Vacation of Stay Orders in Six Months - A Positive Affirmation

Cases in India can take years to be disposed of. Stay of proceedings on account of interim orders has been greatly responsible for causing inordinate delay in disposal of cases. These orders typically stay effective unless expressly vacated, or until a final order is passed, which then subsumes the interim order. Interim orders that stay proceedings before a subordinate court are often misused by litigants as a dilatory tactic to maintain status quo in their favor. The subordinate courts account for 87% of India’s pending cases.[1] A greater challenge faced by the judiciary and litigants alike is the delay in determination of cases at the appellate level, which in turn leads to endless wait for determination of matters even at the trial stage. The Law Ministry estimates that on an average, a trial is delayed by about 6.5 years due to stay of proceedings by higher courts.[2]
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 Supreme Court sets out object and purpose of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908

Introduction

Judicial time is precious and ought to be employed in the most efficient manner possible. Sham litigations are one such menace that not only waste the time of the courts, but also cause unwarranted prejudice and harm to parties arrayed as defendants in such litigations, thereby defeating justice. In order to deal with such a menace, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), under Order VII Rule 11[1] (“O7 R 11”) provides litigants the option to pursue an independent and special remedy, empowering courts to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any grounds contained in this provision.

Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India (“SC”) in the case of Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali[2] (“Case”), while dealing with an appeal against an order allowing rejection of a suit at the threshold, had occasion to consider various precedents, discussing the intent and purpose of O7 R11, while setting out the principles in relation to the same.
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Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Requirements for admissibility of electronic evidence revisited by the Supreme Court

Background

A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court recently held that the requirement of a certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”), is a condition  precedent to the admissibility of electronic record in evidence.[1] This judgment arose from a reference by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court, which found that the Division Bench judgment in Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh[2] required reconsideration in view of the three-judge bench judgment in Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer.[3]
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