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An Insolvency Regulator as Valuation Authority? Rethinking Clause 73 of Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026

Summary: Clause 73 would make the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India the country’s statutory Valuation Authority. The profession needs a regulator, but the insolvency regulator may be the wrong home for it, as India’s own expert committee and the practice of comparable jurisdictions suggest.

The Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, introduced in the Lok Sabha on March 23, 2026, and since referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee, proposes over a hundred amendments to the Companies Act, 2013, and the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008. A less-noticed but structurally significant one is Clause 73, which amends Section 247 to designate the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (“IBBI”) as the “Valuation Authority”.[1] In that capacity, IBBI would grant certificates of registration and recognition to registered valuers and their organisations, recommend valuation standards to the Central Government, and enforce compliance — coupled with the power to suspend a valuer’s certificate for up to ten years or impose penalties of up to ₹10 lakh.

While the policy instinct is sound, the question that needs to be addressed is more profound: Is the insolvency regulator the right institution to house the statutory regulator? India’s valuation profession has long been fragmented and under-institutionalised, and a single authority applying uniform standards is an attractive corrective. Both the Indian regulatory history and the way comparable jurisdictions organise valuation oversight suggest the choice deserves closer scrutiny than it has so far received.

An interim arrangement, made permanent

IBBI’s role in valuation is not unique to the 2026 Bill. Under the Companies (Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017, the Central Government assigned IBBI the functions of the “Authority” that regulates registered valuers.[2] But that was, by design, a limited-purpose and transitional arrangement. It was introduced alongside the roll-out of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and its remit was tied to valuations required under the Code and the Companies Act. Registered valuers were brought under the IBBI because valuation is integral to insolvency resolution — the determination of fair value and liquidation value in the corporate insolvency resolution process — and the IBBI was the regulator at hand.

Clause 73 changes the character of that arrangement. An interim delegation, anchored to a particular statutory context, may become a permanent feature of primary legislation, with the IBBI recast as the standing Valuation Authority for all valuations under the Companies Act. That is a different proposition and should be assessed on its own merits, not treated as part of status quo.

The road not taken

The Government’s own view was different not long ago. In 2019, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a Committee of Experts, chaired by the then IBBI Chairperson Mr. M.S. Sahoo, to examine the need for an institutional framework for the regulation and development of valuation professionals. The Committee’s 2020 report recommended a dedicated statutory regulator — a National Institute of Valuers (“NIV”) — modelled on the self-regulatory architecture of professional bodies such as the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. It also annexed a Draft Valuers Bill, 2020, to give effect to that design.[3] The Committee conceived the NIV as a purpose-built, standalone home for a multidisciplinary profession, framed to serve the profession and society over the long term.

Clause 73 sets that blueprint aside. In a substantive departure from the Government’s own expert recommendation, it entrenches the insolvency regulator instead of a dedicated regulator. The Bill’s Statement of Objects and Reasons offers minimal explanation on why annexation was preferred over a dedicated institution.

The case for IBBI

The most persuasive argument is continuity. Since 2018, the IBBI has built and run the entire registered-valuer ecosystem — the valuers’ organisations, the entry examination, the registers and the disciplinary machinery — and it has notified the International Valuation Standards for valuations within its remit, aligning Indian practice with the global benchmark. A single authority with statutory teeth also solves a real problem: the regulatory arbitrage that arises when several competing self-regulatory organisations set divergent standards. Consolidation promotes consistency, comparability and accountability.

Further, setting up a new regulator is costly and time-consuming. The 2020 NIV proposal was met with objections and legal challenges from certain segments of the existing valuer community. Additionally, it posed unresolved jurisdictional concerns between the Ministry of Corporate Affairs and the Ministry of Finance , given the longstanding registration framework established by the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. Building on IBBI avoids reopening those battles.

Three reservations

However, three reservations may outweigh these advantages, as they concern institutional design rather than transition costs.

The first is mandate mismatch. IBBI is essentially an insolvency regulator. The objectives of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code — time-bound resolution, maximisation of value and balancing of competing stakeholder interests — differ from those of regulating a profession. Valuation spans many areas beyond insolvency: mergers and acquisitions, fund-raising, buy-backs and capital reduction, related-party transactions, financial reporting, taxation, family settlements and commercial disputes — and only a few valuations under the Companies Act relate to insolvency. Placing regulation within an insolvency-centric body risks applying standards that don’t fit the wider scope of valuation work.

The second is institutional bandwidth. IBBI is already stretched. Its mandate is discharged against a backdrop of persistent concerns relating to delay and capacity. Adding the burden of regulation of the entire valuation profession — spanning real property, business and securities, financial instruments and intangible assets — risks overload unless IBBI’s capacity is sufficiently strengthened.

The third is independence. Where a valuer’s report is used within a corporate insolvency resolution process, the same authority would be regulating both the processes —the insolvency professionals who appoint the valuers and the valuers themselves, creating an appearance problem atleast, and a potential for conflict in the exercise of disciplinary powers.

What other jurisdictions do

How do mature jurisdictions handle valuation oversight? The overarching architecture is set globally by the International Valuation Standards Council (“IVSC”), the independent standard-setter whose International Valuation Standards (“IVS”) are applied in over a hundred countries. The IVSC sets standards but does not license or accredit valuers; that responsibility belongs to national authorities.[4] The consistent feature is that no leading jurisdiction places valuation-profession regulation within its insolvency or bankruptcy regulator.

In the United Kingdom, valuation is professionally self-regulation. The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), under the Royal Charter, sets and enforces valuation standards through its “Red Book,” which incorporates the IVS; insolvency regulation is a separate regime altogether.[5]

The United States has one quasi-statutory apparatus, but it is confined to real-estate appraisal for federally-related transactions and is not run by the bankruptcy system. Title XI of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 created a structure through which the private Appraisal Foundation promulgated the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and appraiser qualification criteria. The Appraisal Subcommittee (a unit of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, a bank-supervision coordinator) provides federal oversight, and State boards license and discipline appraisers.[6] Business and securities valuation lie outside this regime, governed by professional credentialing bodies.

Australia has no dedicated valuation authority. Business valuation is governed by APES 225, issued by the accounting profession’s ethics board. In the capital-markets context, it is the securities regulator, ASIC, that polices valuation quality through its guidance on content and independence of independent expert reports at the point of disclosure, rather than by licensing the profession.[7]

Singapore offers the closest analogue to a dedicated valuation body and it is instructive. The Institute of Valuers and Appraisers, Singapore, which confers the Chartered Valuer and Appraiser credential, was established by the Singapore Accountancy Commission, a statutory body under the Ministry of Finance.[8] It sits within the accountancy-and-finance framework — not the insolvency regulator, which operates under separate legislation.

Canada, through the CBV Institute, and Hong Kong follow the same self-regulatory pattern.

The comparative lesson is not that the State should stay out of valuation; several jurisdictions involve it. It is that where a dedicated regulator exists, it is housed within an accountancy, finance or professional framework, and where the State intervenes more directly, it does so through a purpose-built standards apparatus or through the securities regulator at the disclosure gateway. Tying the function to the insolvency regulator would make India an outlier.

A pragmatic path forward

None of this makes Clause 73 indefensible. If speed and continuity are the overriding priorities, retaining IBBI as a transitional authority is a reasonable choice. But a more coherent long-term architecture — the one indicated by the Sahoo Committee and comparative practice — is a dedicated, ring-fenced valuation regulator.

However, if Parliament proceeds with IBBI as the Valuation Authority, the design should be fortified with safeguards. Four seem essential: a functionally autonomous valuation division within the IBBI, with its own Board, budget and disciplinary process, firewalled from the insolvency function; a standards-setting mechanism with genuine cross-sectoral representation — real property, business and securities, financial instruments and intangibles — calibrated to the IVS rather than to insolvency policy; explicit conflict-management rules governing valuations within insolvency proceedings; and a review or sunset clause committing the Government to migrate to a dedicated regulator as the ecosystem matures, an approach that mirrors the adaptable, least-disruptive philosophy the Committee of Experts itself espoused.

As per the Committee, the valuation profession carries all three classic sources of market failure — information asymmetry, externalities and market power — and hence warrants regulation. But the case for regulating the profession is not the same as the case for regulating it through the insolvency regulator. The Joint Parliamentary Committee ought to examine this distinction before enacting Clause 73 in its present form.


[1]Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, Clause 73, amending s. 247 of the Companies Act, 2013. The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 2026 and referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.

[2]Companies (Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017. The Central Government delegated to IBBI the functions of the “Authority” under these Rules.

[3]Report of the Committee of Experts to Examine the Need for an Institutional Framework for Regulation and Development of Valuation Professionals (Ministry of Corporate Affairs, 2020), together with the accompanying Draft Valuers Bill, 2020.

[4]International Valuation Standards Council, International Valuation Standards. The IVSC is a not-for-profit global standard-setter; it does not accredit or license individual valuers, a function performed at the national level.

[5]RICS Valuation – Global Standards (the “Red Book”), which incorporates the International Valuation Standards.

[6]Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (United States), Title XI. The Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice are promulgated by The Appraisal Foundation, with federal oversight by the Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council and licensing by State appraiser boards.

[7]APES 225 (Valuation Services), Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board; ASIC Regulatory Guide 111 (Content of Expert Reports) and Regulatory Guide 112 (Independence of Experts).

[8]Institute of Valuers and Appraisers, Singapore, established under the Singapore Accountancy Commission; the Chartered Valuer and Appraiser programme is benchmarked to the International Valuation Standards.